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Electronic Technology: Law
and the Legal Mind
Introduction
Electronic technology pervades contemporary Western societies. Law-
yers have enthusiastically embraced this technology. A respectable vol-
ume of literature now addresses the application of computers to some of
the more mechanical aspects of law, such as legal accounting and the
creation of legal databases.' A growing body of literature relates to the
possibilities of the application of artificial intelligence in law.2 But to
date, surprisingly little literature deals with how this new technology
affects what might be termed legal consciousness 3 and legal culture.4
Therein lies the value of The Electronic Media and The Transformation of
Law.5 In this work, Professor Ethan Katsh sets himself a formidable
task. Professor Katsh wants to understand how lawyering "was" under
* Ajustice of the High Court of New Zealand. Formerly, Professor of Law, and
Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. Visiting Professor
of Law, Cornell Law School, Fall 1992. I express my appreciation to my research
assistants Marc Lurie and David Kresock.
1. See MAGGS & SPROWL, COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN THE LAw (1987).
2. See, e.g., COMPUTING POWER AND LEGAL REASONING (Charles Walter ed., 1985).
3. The notion of legal consciousness is very problematic. It somehow implies the
existence of a legal "mind." It also implies that lawyers' thinking differs from that of
other disciplines, or perhaps even that of all non-lawyers.
This matter has been the focus of an increasingly sharp debate in recent years and
remains one of the largely unarticulated issues between those who espouse the criti-
cal legal studies movement, and those who do not. The notion that law is somehow
"apart," or that it at least forms a discrete discipline, stands as one of the fundamen-
tal tenets of the traditional common lawyer. Notwithstanding the very real difficulties
attendant upon a concept of legal consciousness, it does suggest, however, that
focusing on the way lawyers actually go about defining and sorting through problems
and particular issues is a very important inquiry. See generally Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987).
4. We still possess a very imperfect understanding as to whether we can prop-
erly talk about a "legal culture" and what, in the case of the common law jurisdic-
tions, that actually means. But again, an inquiry into the information network or
environment in which lawyers actually work is likely to be a very important element in
understanding whether there is something which might properly be termed a legal
culture.
5. M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW
(1989).
26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 167 (1993)
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conditions in which print media predominated, and how, if at all, things
have changed in a world increasingly dominated by electronic media.
Consequently, he grapples with what law "was"; what it "is" now or,
rather, is becoming; how this change affects lawyers' ways of thinking
and doing things; and even the very idea of law itself. Professor Katsh
has developed a quite distinct thesis about what he perceives to be the
"transformation" of law. The thesis is one that deserves to be taken
seriously.6
In this essay I propose first to outline and, second, to critique
Katsh's thesis. As the title to the book clearly implies, Katsh seems to
think that very large, if not transformative, changes 7 have occurred or
are quite distinctly afoot in relation to law as a result of the advent of the
new electronic technologies. If correct, a claim of that kind goes to the
very heart of the idea of "law." Moreover, if the changes are indeed
transformative, the claim ought to hold true universally; hence the new
order, whatever it is, would be of a "scientific" character. One conse-
quence which follows from this proposition is that the impact of technol-
ogy on law would be largely the same in any given jurisdiction.
I contend that it is presently far from clear that a claim of that
dimension can be sustained. 8 I will, however, come this far with Katsh-
electronic technology is clearly having a distinct impact on law, as
6. Interestingly, this book has received far more attention outside the law
reviews than within them. This apparent lack of attention within the legal community
illustrates a criticism I make later in this essay: generally perceiving information in
narrow technical terms, legal academics demonstrate little interest in tackling the for-
midable intellectual and practical problems associated with the deeper issues raised
by information technology.
Persons outside the legal academy, however, appear to have better recognised the
significance of the issues. For a full review of the work, see Steven M. Barkan, Law
and Information, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 365 (1990). For shorter reviews, see Donald E.
Lively, Book Review, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1990); Kent R. Middleton, Undermining
Patterns in Law And Society?, 75 JUDICATURE 115 (1991); Igor I. Kavass, Book Review,
18 INTr'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 161 (1990); Kenneth Jost, The Global Village, A.B.A.J., Feb.
1990, at 95; Robert W. Benson, Book Review, CAL. LAw., Feb. 1990, at 62. Several
student Notes have also addressed this topic, see Eric M. Reifschneider, Book Note, 3
HAR. J.L. & TECH. 253 (1990); Anita L. Morse, Book Note, 13 LEGAL STUD. F. 435
(1989); Book Note, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1990). The New York Times carried a full
length review by Professor Patricia Williams of the University of Wisconsin at
Madison Law School. See PatriciaJ. Williams, Law Without Lawbooks, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug.
20, 1989, at 23.
7. It is unclear whether Katsh uses the term "transformative" in a Kuhnian
sense. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962). A "paradigm" for Kuhn is a model or pattern accepted in science "like a
judicial decision in the common law.., an object for further articulation and specifi-
cation under new or more stringent conditions." Id. at 23. The survival of a para-
digm depends upon its success in actually solving "real" problems in a field. It
"transforms" when the model has lost this force and been replaced by something
quite different.
8. Katsh might argue that he does not specifically categorise his claims in such
large terms. Nevertheless, the totality of the averments in the work adds up to a
meta-thesis of the suggested dimension. That my reading of the author's claims is not
idiosyncratic seems to be supported by Middleton's comment (in a generally lauda-
tory review) that the thesis "is overstated." Middleton, supra note 6, at 116.
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opposed to generating a true transformation "of" law. That being so,
and given the surprising dearth of conceptual or empirical studies of the
impact of electronic technology on law, as a third element in this essay I
suggest, with due diffidence, some potential lines of inquiry for legal
(and other) scholars. In particular, I suggest that we have not given
nearly enough attention to the economics of information; to problems
of power and class in relation to information, and what that may mean
for legal ordering; to problems arising out of the changing geography of
information; and to more mundane matters of legal technique. In gen-
eral, I suggest that the area is a particularly fertile one for future aca-
demic research by lawyers.
I. The Katsh Thesis
Katsh's central premise states that "law is a process of communica-
tion."9 This premise, apparently, is all pervasive in the institution of
law. "Manipulation of information underlies the way legal institutions
work, how legal doctrines are applied, and how social and moral values
are translated into legal values."' 0 Further, "law has come to rely on
the transmission of information in a particular form [i.e., print].""
Consequently, "our [Western] model of law has coincided with the age
of the printed word and is an outgrowth of it."12 Thus, the arrival of
"the electronic media" engenders a "transformation in law."' 5 This
transformation manifests itself in several forms.
First, the new media are destabilising, particularly with respect to a
doctrine of precedent. An important function of modern law, one "tied
to the qualities of print,"' 4 has been to mediate between stability and
change. Now, however, "the electronic media threaten the law's current
techniques of maintaining both tradition and change." 1s
Second, the law also functions as a major societal agency for the
settlement of disputes. "As other means of communication are used in
lieu of print, our attitudes toward the kinds of techniques that should be
used to settle problems are likely to change."' 16
Third, there are serious implications for control of information in
this brave new world. "[A]ll legal doctrines that concern information
are in a state of flux."'1 7 This fact has implications for relationships inter
se, and even for the legal conception of a "state," because it challenges
the traditional interest of those in authority in restricting information
flows.
9. KATSH, supra note 5, at 1.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id. at 13. Notice, though, that the author does not say, "of" law here.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Fourth, the character of the legal profession may be changing. The
concept of a profession is based, in part, on the acquisition of certain
disciplinary skills, and to a large extent, on a guarded, or controlled
body of information. Whilst the profession may welcome the new tech-
nologies for efficiency reasons, "their consequences may be very differ-
ent from what is expected."' 8
Fifth, Katsh suggests that the electronic media may be altering sub-
stantive ends in the law. The last two decades have seen a substantial
rights revolution in which the principal endeavour has been to accomo-
date previously disenfranchised groups. The new media, he thinks,
increase pressure for real equality rather than merely legal equality.
Consequently "the value of a right and its perception as a highly stable
and secure form of legal protection may erode as information is stored
in a more transitory form and is continually processed and
reprocessed." 19
So conceived, Katsh's thesis is very large, and somewhat speculative
in the sense that no one could currently, or indeed ever, "prove" all the
assertions made. Professor Katsh's speculation presents something of a
meta-thesis, and therefore is more in the tradition of scholars like polit-
ical economist Harold Innis, communications theorist Marshal
McLuhan, and historian Daniel Boorstin. Significantly, the book fre-
quently references these leading thinkers on the nature and meaning of
technology and communications.
The quotes in the frontispiece to the Introduction are particularly
revealing of the author's purpose. From Unger's Law and Modern Society,
the author quotes: "The study of the legal system takes us straight to
the central problems faced by society itself." And from Boorstin's, The
Republic of Technology, the author suggests that "once mankind has cre-
ated a printing press, a musket, a telephone, an automobile, an airplane,
a television, each of these takes on a life of its own." Indeed they do.
But the quotations raise this general question of Katsh's book: do the
new media truly transform, or subsume law as we have most recently
known it in the West? Or is it that, as with sponge cakes, new layers of
phenomena are sometimes added to the recipe, but the "law" cake
remains recognizably a cake?
The answer to this question is critical. If the new technologies are
not truly transformative, then the legal techniques and adjustments
required are something akin to the approach to the evolution of copy-
right law. That is, the law can assimilate the new problems into what
remains essentially a historic formula.
If, on the other hand, these technologies are transformative in rela-
tion to "law," the proper approach to be adopted by legal regulation is
likely to be formidable and, indeed, very difficult to imagine in the
abstract. For the "new" law would not look like law as we now conceive
18. Id.
19. Id. at 15.
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it to be. This general question, which is the central concern of this
essay, is best pursued in the context of the more particularised asser-
tions of the author.
A. The Death of Precedent?
Lawyers are notorious for the value they place on consistency. Consis-
tency necessarily means adherence, to a large degree, to the past. On
the other hand, we praise poets, painters and even other academics,
such as scientists, for their creative breaks from the past.
Why, then, do lawyers place such heavy emphasis on consistency? 20
Katsh attributes this to the "stabilising" function of law. He reminds us
of Fuller's famous parable about King Rex, who, filled with reforming
zeal when he came to office, tried to change too much too quickly, and
ended up creating no worthwhile law at all.2 1 Writing, and later print,
provided an ideal medium for this kind of stabilising function.
As Katsh sees it, the gradualist thesis of common law argument that
evolved stands in marked contrast to the almost static character of law-
making in oral societies. There, all authorised adults were "The Text,"
but had to devote huge energies to remembering the past and
regurgitating it into a somewhat different (and hence unyielding) pres-
ent. Katsh finds it significant, as Professor Brian Simpson reminds us,
that originally even print lacked "authority."' 22 Katsh notes, "[b]y 1794,
[however,] Edmund Burke could validly assert that to put an end to the
Reports is to put an end to the law of England." 23
So far so good. Most of what Katsh has to say in this section of the
book about these matters remains fairly conventional. Many lawyers and
scholars, however, will find more controversial his subsequent assertion
that "the almost unlimited capacity of computers to store, communicate,
and search for information poses an enormous threat to the authority of
precedent, yet it is a completely unrecognised threat."' 24 The thrust of
the argument appears to be that computer technology is compromising
20. Katsh cites Justice Louis Brandeis's famous statement that, "in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right." KATSH, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 405 (1931) (BrandeisJ, dissenting)).
21. KATSH, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
33-38 (rev. ed. 1969) (quotational citation omitted)).
22. Id. at 38 (quoting A. W. B. Simpson, The Source and Function of the Later Year
Books, 87 LAW Q. REv. 94, 97 (1971)).
23. Id. at 39 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, as quoted in WILLIAM HoLDswoRTH, SOME
LEssONS FROM OUR LEGAL HISTORY 18 (1928)).
24. Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Katsh repeatedly emphasizes this threat. A sys-
tem of precedent will be "unworkable when there are too many cases." Id. "The
authority of case law is promoted by a process that does not rapidly modify reported
decisions." Id. at 46. "Many of the goals of law have been achieved by limiting some
kinds of information." Id. at 47. For instance, on this last point, well equipped law
libraries are now on-line to generalist libraries. Yet one may well ask whether this
has any measurable effect on the broadening reach of the legal researcher, and the
visible decline in the emphasis on core appellate decisions, as the "proper study" of
law.
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the stabilising function of the common law system. I would make several
points about this assertion.
First, the advent of Lexis, Westlaw and other data bases in the
United States has significantly altered the pattern of legal research in
those jurisdictions. These databases contain a huge volume of reported
case law, statutory material, and legislative histories. The jibe that one
can find authority in the Unites States for almost any proposition may
well be true. But is the proposition even marginally correct elsewhere?
For instance, my home jurisdiction, New Zealand, still possesses only
one major series of law reports.25 Although there are a number of spe-
cialist series of law reports and electronic databases, such as Kiwinet, the
volume of case law remains well in hand. The point here is that one
must be very careful in suggesting a "transformative" change in the
character of law itself solely on the basis of experience in a single, if
admittedly very large, jurisdiction.
Second, is there not a distinction between retrieval and use? Assum-
ing one locates authority by electronic means, what do lawyers then in
fact do? Surely they then order up a hard copy of the item in question,
and begin to mark that hard copy up, in a quite orthodox way?
Third, one should not assume that lawyers will yield lightly, if at all,
to a retreat from principle, whatever the pressure from a mass of mate-
rial. Indeed, in recent years there has been something of a revolt in
intellectual terms against the perceived dangers of a "wilderness of sin-
gle instances." 26
To take one instance, Professor Atiyah's widely respected Inaugural
Lecture at Oxford2 7 protested the perceived trend away from principle.
Moreover, is not the law and economics movement in the United States,
under the tutelage of its principal arch-priest (now) Judge Richard Pos-
ner, nothing more nor less than an attempt to develop more rigorous
lines of principle? 28 In short, we should not assume that either the aca-
demic or judicial levels of the legal enterprise will surrender easily, if at
all, what has been seen to be a cardinal attribute of "law": the attempt,
however imperfectly achieved, to provide a relatively disinterested set of
yardsticks by which embattled societies and citizens may regulate their
conduct. That legal principles exist in a fog of information does not
render them less visible or important. The lighthouse becomes ever
25. The New Zealand Law Reports. Indeed, that series still only reports three
volumes of case law each year.
26. Alfred Lord Tennyson, Aylmer's Field, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TENNY-
SON 463, 480 (Hallan Lord Tennyson ed., 2d. ed. 1908).
27. From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes ipz the Function of theJudicial Process and the
Law, reprinted in 65 IowA L. REV. 1249, 1271 (1980). See also Lord Goff, The Search for
Principle, 69 PROC. OF BRIT. ACAD. 169 (1983); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & P. S. ATIYAH,
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
28. See Gary Minda, The Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies Movements in
American Law, in NICHOLAS MERCURO, LAW AND ECONOMICS 87 (1989).
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more important as the fog of information rolls in.2 9
Fourth, Katsh makes one particularly arresting, if rather unrefined,
assertion relating to the categorisation of legal information. He sug-
gests that "[c]omputerised research facilities ... threaten to undermine
the categorization of information that lies at the core of the precedent
process."3 0 Katsh makes this statement in the context of what he sees as
the broadening range of materials now readily available to lawyers. The
statement, however, also brings to mind two other contemporary phe-
nomena in the law that Katsh does not address.
The first is that there has been much current debate amongst law-
yers, on both sides of the Atlantic and in Australasia, about the contem-
porary categorisations or formal subject matter divisions of the law. Has
contract collapsed into tort?3 1 Has equity invaded commercial law?3 2 Is
the criminal law blurring into the civil law? And so on. Whether those
debates are somehow linked to the advent of computerized research,
however, is not easy to see. One could argue that reconciling all the
cases on a particular problem (say, illegality in contract) is much more
difficult when there are thousands of cases. Perhaps, then, categories do
become "over-burdened," tending to collapse under their own weight.
But that is precisely when Atiyah's thesis should come into play.
The law should neither descend into pragmatism nor to "a wilderness of
single instances." Nor, I would say, should we try to continue the royal
tennis tradition beloved of many traditional common lawyers33 by
attempting to reconcile all the cases. The solution lays in articulating
and holding to whatever principles are thought to be appropriate.
A related matter has to do with the "presentism" of much case law
argument today. By that term I mean two things: first, the endless chase
by practising lawyers after the very latest cases in a given subject area as
"authority"; and second, the more of them the better. This failure of
counsel to nail their colours to the mast in the form of particularised
arguments leads to arguments swollen with information. But the prob-
lem here- and it is a live one troubling judges at all levels and in all
jurisdictions-remains behavioral, rather than something intrinsic to the
electronic media.
In short, whether lawyers slide into a bottomless pit of information
is a matter of professional self-discipline. I doubt that one can squarely
lay this unfortunate phenomenon at the door of electronic technology,
though it may well be guilty of aiding and abetting.
29. The allusion owes something to Prosser's famous article on legal education.
See William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 257 (1948).
30. KATSH, supra note 5, at 47.
31. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT (1974).
32. A discussion with respect to the collapse of the law-equity destruction in com-
mercial law remedies may be found in R. Grant Hammond, The Place of Damages in the
Scheme of Remedies, in ESSAYS ON DAMAGES 192 (Finn ed., Law Book Co. 1992).
33. This consists in marking out a square on the (intellectual) ground and trying
to demonstrate how every case fits within that square. A stray obiter dictum then
becomes as offensive a missile as a tennis ball hit right out of the tennis court.
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B. Law as the Principle Vehicle of Dispute Resolution?
The thrust of Katsh's argument in this part of the book is that "writing
and print are the structural supports for the modem ideal of dispute
resolution and have contributed to law's growth over time, to our reli-
ance on law, and to the authority of law."'34 Katsh has to be correct in
suggesting that law quite consciously limits the kind of information that
is employed in reaching a decision. For example, the reader is undoubt-
edly familiar with the lay complaint that what the client thought to be
relevant did not seem to matter to her lawyer. And, in going to law,
moreover, the client agrees (probably without realising it) to limit infor-
mation to the kind that a court uses to "impose" a decision. Yet, how, if
at all, does this change with the kinds of alternate dispute resolution
processes that are emerging?
Katsh notes the point made by anthropologists that so-called "prim-
itive" societies demonstrated a level of morality and peacefulness
"higher than most of their economically advanced fellowmen. ' '3 5 Oral
debate, the force of custom, public opinion (in the form of "shaming" or
"ridicule"), ritual and ceremony, and so on, all played their part.
Writing on the other hand creates and evinces "distance." By
standardising legal information, writing further fosters the authority of
the common law. This continuity through uniformity can also be seen in
the nature of legal questions in the common law legal tradition. "The
process of law, for it to work according to plan, must structure and limit
the mind of the judge."136 In the end, law filters or drives out the per-
plexities of a given case and becomes a zero-sum game-somebody
wins, and somebody loses- all in accordance with an abstracted
formula.
This part of the Katsh book is a compelling and well-written
account.37 But having described what conflict resolution "is," Katsh has
more difficulty in dealing with what it is "becoming." Unlike some com-
munications theorists, Katsh perceives the new electronic media as a
fragmenting force promoting heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.
An electronic information society, in Katsh's view, means more rather
than less interaction, and on a wider scale. He contrasts the man who
dies in Kafka's The Trial without ever having received access to formal,
written justice with the "revolving door" concepts of dispute resolution
that have evolved in the United States. Apparently, Katsh sees a contin-
uing trend in which "The Law" increasingly fails to keep law confined to
the courthouse. At a deeper level Katsh's thesis adopts James Ben-
inger's argument that a "societ[y's] ability to maintain control-at all
levels from interpersonal to international relations-will be directly pro-
34. KATSH, supra note 5, at 51.
35. Id. at 54 (quoting PASCUAL GISBERT, PRELITERATE MAN X (1967).
36. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). This brings to mind the North American jibes
that "Law Schools, like McDonalds, only do one thing, but they do that very well;"
and, "Law sharpens the mind by narrowing it."
37. Id. at 63-88.
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portional to the development of its information technologies." 3 8 In the
end though, this conclusion lacks intellectual strength: there will be or
already is an "expansion of options" for dispute resolution; practices
and expectations will continue to evolve and new forms of ordering
emerge.
C. Legal Doctrines and Information
It is convenient to deal with matters under this head in two categories-
the position of the state, and the position of individuals vis-d-vis each
other.
As to the state, George Orwell assumed that electronic forms of
communication were malignant tools playing into the hands of a totali-
tarian state.39 As it has transpired, that assertion remains, at best,
unproven. It may be, as Marshall McLuhan thought, that the whole phe-
nomenon of Hitler became possible only through the advent of modern
radio systems.40 On the other hand, one can possibly ascribe (in large
part) the recent political developments in Eastern Europe to the power
of electronic communications which bring home the real position of
individuals and, hence, encourage widespread civil disobedience as well
as new kinds of communitarian movements. The title of Ithiel de Sola
Pool's fine book, Technologies of Freedom,4 1 then becomes more apt than
that distinguished scholar likely foresaw. Indeed, Emile Durkheim
reminds sociologists (and us as well) that people have become more free
even as the powers of the state have grown.
4 2
In terms of legal doctrine limiting the state, although formidable,
the state's legal powers to gather and control the disemination of infor-
mation remain limited. Katsh correctly suggests that "the movement of
information is the primary focus of many legal doctrines," and that this
is important because "[plower is enhanced whenever one can manipu-
late who receives or does not receive certain information."'43 Yet the
traditional legal concern for a (relatively) free press has withstood the
test of time well. Freedom of information legislation diverts some infor-
mation back to the populace at large. Individuals are today far more
"litigious" on these sorts of matters vis-d-vis the state. Ombudsmen, and
other forms of investigatory commissions, play vital roles. At the end of
the day, it seems that the state is ultimately no more able to monopolise
information than is the individual.
Notwithstanding this insight, the largest difficulty in both public and
private law is that individuals, commercial concerns and the state contin-
38. Id. at 108-10 (quotingJAMES BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNO-
LOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 9 (1986)).
39. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, ORWELL: THE LOST WRITINGS (W. J. West ed.,
1985).
40. MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 300 (1964).
41. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
42. See also Colin Cherry, On the Political Significance of the Telephone Service, in THE
SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE TELEPHONE 124 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1977).
43. KATSH, supra note 5, at 116.
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ually attempt to commodify information for private gain. 44 Today,
information is reified, traded, and litigated over, like a piece of timber,
or a lathe, in both the public and private sectors. Businessmen speak of
their "proprietary information" as being their single most important
asset. To protect and promote this asset, intellectual property law, and
even contract, tort, equity and criminal law doctrines are squeezed into
play in ways unforeseen by their originators.
This legal strategy is increasingly strained, if not downright inap-
propriate,45 and leads to paradoxical results. For instance, in New Zea-
land, the state recently privatised the Government Printing Office. The
new commercial concern now sells the statute law of that jurisdiction,
evolved with the citizens' money, back to those citizens 46
Katsh correctly emphasizes that most of our law on the "flow of
information" derives from the print era. 47 These legal doctrines
attempt to accomodate concerns for free speech, property and other
economic rights as well as social and moral values.48 Some kind of bal-
ance has to be struck. But the old balances are no longer appropriate.
Perhaps the concepts themselves are no longer viable.
Copyright provides a very good example. Copyright began its life
as a restrictive form of state licencing. In granting stationers the exclu-
sive right to republish literary works, the English crown practiced a lim-
ited form of censorship. But eventually, the republication right became
that of the "author." Struggling authors traded that right to publishers
in exchange for royalties. All worked well enough, at least for print. Yet
with electronic information things do not work so well and, perhaps, not
well enough to justify maintaining the status quo.
Part of the problem is semantic. 49 What people (and machines)
actually do today does not relate well to the current language of the
law. 50 But the way we create has also changed, and "the act of creation
in the future will involve working with copied information." 5' As I have
noted elsewhere, the same information may be created electronically by
a different computer program, though the information itself remains
identical in every respect.52 Manipulation of information to create
44. See R. Grant Hammond, The Legal Protection of Ideas, 29 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 93
(1991).
45. See the attempt to reify "information" as a commodity that may be stolen in
the Canadian decision R. v. Stewart [1988], 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. 4th 1, discussed in
R. Grant Hammond, Theft ofInformation, 100 LAw Q. REV. 252 (1984). See also Arnold
S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38 U. TORoNTo LJ. 117 (1988); R. Grant Ham-
mond, The Misappropriation of Commercial Information in the Computer Age, 64 CAN. B.
REV. 342 (1986).
46. See R. Grant Hammond, Intellectual & Industrial Property, N.Z. RECENT L. REV.
226, 228 (1990).
47. See KATSH, supra note 5, at 171.
48. Id. at 170.
49. Id. at 178.
50. For example, what do we mean by an "author" today?
51. KATSH, supra note 5, at 176.
52. Grant, supra note 44, at 113.
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"new" items out of many items of other works is commonplace, the
most recent dispute being the so-called "sampling" debate in the music
industry.53 Hybrid forms of intellectual creation continue to emerge.
The current body of intellectual property law remains a relatively crude
instrument to address the nuances and sophistication of electronically
manipulated creation.
Moreover, and this is a point Katsh does not raise, the law may not
be able to differentiate quickly enough. The present time frame of crea-
tion greatly differs from the assumptions of traditional legal concepts.
Commercial lead time matters most today lest one's creations be "cop-
ied" in one form or another by competitors.
In many ways, these current problems with copyright exemplify the
problems of the law and electronic technology in general. Is there a
case for legal protection at all? If so, is it a matter of simply working the
new technologies into existing statutes and the common law? Or, are
those regimes now obsolete and in need of replacement?
Katsh rightly points to the problems. Moreover, his general point
that they intrinsically arise from a change of medium is obviously sound.
Yet Katsh fails to move from the descriptive to the prescriptive. He does
not point to the desirable or necessary features of a new regime or
regimes. And the moment that this last issue is raised, a very large eco-
nomic issue comes to the fore. If a producer of potentially valuable
information is unable to overcome the free-rider problem, why should
that producer produce at all? 54 Altruism, or pure interest, extends only
so far in an age when research and development costs are prohibitively
high. Katsh never fully acknowledges this most difficult of problems:
the clash between humanism and the economic view of creativity.
Copyright was a post-print concept. Do we need a post-electronic
technology paradigm? If we do, it must be more flexible and less tech-
nology bound in order to respond quickly to a wider range of creations
than anything we have seen to date in the law.55
D. The Legal Profession
In this section of the book, Katsh first notes some of the more obvious
features of recent changes in the legal profession: the great increase in
53. On digital sampling, see Quail, Digital Samplers: Can Copyright Protect Music from
the Numbers Game?, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 39 (1991). On the problems of post-modem
artistic creativity, see Rogers v. Koons and Sonnabend Gallery, 751 F. Supp. 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), modified 777 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 930 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1992) and Martha Buskirk, Art and the Law: Appropriation under the Gun, ART IN
AMERICA, June 1992, at 37. There is also the problem of digital retouching, literally
illustrated by KATSH, supra note 5, at 176.
54. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980); EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW
(1982); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1991).
55. For a suggestion that we ought to develop a technology code, see R. Grant
Hammond, The Misappropriation of Commercial Information in the Computer Age, 64 CAN. B.
REV. 342 (1986).
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the number of practitioners; the corporatisation of the profession
(smaller practices are under threat); the elimination of some anti-com-
petitive practices; and the increasing heterogeneity in the profession.5 6
Political and economic factors are commonly assumed to be responsible
for these changes.
In perhaps the book's most arresting and original section, Katsh
then suggests that the current "transition to electronic modes of com-
munication is part of the latest phase of a lengthy historical process of
definition of who and what lawyers are."5 7 The legal profession, he
thinks, welcomes the new technologies for increased productivity with-
out understanding that the perceived benefits may be like a Trojan
Horse-"welcomed at first but holding hidden and unwelcome powers
inside." 5 8
As presently conceived, the characteristics of a legal profession
include the acquisition of an organised body of knowledge; authority
over client relationships; control over admission standards; ethical codes
of practice; professional organisation; and (allegedly!) a public service
orientation.
How might the electronic technologies impact upon such an institu-
tion? Once again Katsh sees tremendous significance in the move away
from print. "Print served as a catalyst for the organisation of both
knowledge and people." 59 Electronic media may empower the lay per-
son's access to legal information, though Katsh does not seem to see this.
possibility as a significant force for change. He thinks the real force for
change lies in what kind of legal information is produced, who produces
it, and how this information is organised. 60 He discusses the evolution
of Lexis and Westlaw, and concludes that "the categorical lines and
organizational boundaries that were fostered by print will be
weakened.'"61
These lines are not simply the traditional doctrinal lines of the law,
but more general informational lines. Although not employed by Katsh,
an example is the way many law firms now subscribe to general informa-
tion services such as Compuserve. Law firms now also provide a much
expanded range of services which range far beyond the traditional doc-
trinal analysis of the law. As the boundaries between who performs
what functions erode, the traditional concept of the profession fades,
perhaps to a pale shadow of its traditional self. The legal profession
becomes "more ambiguous." 62
56. KATSH, supra note 5, at 199-201. See also LAWYERS IDEALS/LAWYERS PRAC-
TICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et
al. eds., 1992).
57. KATSH, supra note 5, at 203.
58. Id. at 202.
59. Id at 218.
60. Id. at 220.
61. Id at 222.
62. Id at 226.
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It is easy to empathise with some and perhaps most of Katsh's
observations under this head. The legal profession dearly has become
"more ambiguous." But it is a long step to suggest that something truly
transformative has occurred. The vast bulk of law office transactions
continue primarily to involve a client coming to the practitioner for
advice on what the law is. Given that the law does not and never has
operated in a vacuum, it is all to the good that a lawyer should be a
woman of public life, well versed in the events occuring around her.
Lawyers will inevitably and for the best, acquire a better sense of context
through technology. But she is not a general soothsayer and adviser on
all things. If she tries or pretends to be such, the Trojan Horse may well
open in her courtyard. In such an event the enemy will be seen to be an
older one than the electronic media: none of us can know it all, though
some behave as if they do!
E. The Legal Mind
This section of the book opens with an outline of the way some scholars,
particularly Professor Roberto Unger, perceive legal culture and the
modes of legal thought.6 3 Katsh then suggests "two facets of the mod-
ern legal mind that may be under stress because of the very novel quali-
ties of the new media." The first is "the individual orientation of
modern law." 6 5 The second is "the abstract quality of law." 66
As to the first, the existing legal paradigm regards the individual as
the basic unit of society. This view stands in marked contrast to the
world views held by other societies which held that "[m]an was con-
scious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or
corporation-only through some general category."6 7  Similarly,
"rights" attached, to the extent they attached at all, on a quite different
basis. Although a mass medium, Katsh views print as contributing to the
individualization of persons "by providing information and opportuni-
ties to individuals that it had not been possible to obtain in earlier
times." 6 8 Or, as David Reisman explains, "print is the isolating medium
par excellence." 69
Electronic media can be atomistic, but it can also reach large audi-
ences concurrently as well as particular groups in a way print does not.
In Katsh's view, print exists as a kind of invisible censor; electronic com-
munication, on the other hand, conveys without this barrier. The new
63. Specifically, the author refers to Unger's categorisation of the three different
"forms" of law: customary, bureaucratic, and the legal order. See KATSH, supra note
5, at 230-31 (discussing ROBERTO UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976)).
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 247.
67. 1 JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 143 (S.
G. C. Middlemore trans., 1958).
68. KATSH, supra note 5, at 235.
69. Id. (quoting David Reisman, The Oral and Written Tradition, in EXPLORATIONS IN
COMMUNICATIONS (Edmund Carpenter & Marshall McLuhan eds., 1960)).
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media do not "merely extend... the trends fostered by print." 70 The
spoken word was a group medium; print is both a mass and an individual
medium; electronic communication fosters all three.
The new linkages reflect a different perception of the individual
than an "autonomous, independent, rational, and whole person." 7 1
The individual fragments in an electronic medium and is seen as a col-
lection of interests, values, and desires, to be exploited in various
ways. 72 Groups become not merely collections of individuals, but take
on an altogether different character. The result, Katsh claims, is a con-
ception of the individual and the group differing from the prevailing
conception underlying traditional liberal legal theory.
As to the abstract quality of law, Katsh finds our present law largely
built upon a set "of ideas and concepts that exist apart from the actual
buildings and people of the law." a73 This reliance on abstract concepts
sharply contrasts with the "sensed experience" basis of law. For
instance, ownership did not turn on property rights, but rested on actual
possession. Writing helped promote the recognition of intangible
things, such as "rights" themselves. There occurred what has been
described as a shift from an image culture to a word culture. 74 In law,
this word culture possessed a dehumanising and abstracting influence.
In a telling point, Katsh notes the lack of photographs and illustrations
in the law reports.
What happens in a world of highly flexible and interactive commu-
nications and computer technologies? "The effort of the law to maintain
an imageless body of knowledge that appeals to only our sense of sight
will become more difficult. .... -75 Katsh pursues this line of thought in
the context of the so-called rights revolution since World War II. The
"law often provides a right to equal treatment rather than equal treat-
ment .... -76 This can be overcome only on the basis of individuals in
their concretised, social specificity. The new media, or so the argument
goes, bring home a different conception of these actualities.
What are we to make of these arguments? First, as to the suggested
shift from an image culture to a word culture, some scholars identify a
reverse trend. For instance, Jane Gaines recently suggested that intel-
lectual property law has sanctioned a shift back to an image culture. 77
70. KATSH, supra note 5, at 240.
71. Id. at 245.
72. This is precisely the view emerging in the entertainment law area. Consider
the attempts, already sanctioned by the common law to some extent, to allow com-
modification of various aspects of one's personality. See the cases collected in R.
GRANT HAMMOND, PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES AND COMMENTARY 92 (1991).
73. KATSH, supra note 5, at 247.
74. ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT FOR CHANGE 67
(1979).
75. KATSH, supra note 5, at 262.
76. Id. at 263.
77. JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW
(Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1991). See also IMAGE ETHICS: THE MORAL RIGHTS OF SUB-
JECTS IN PHOTOGRAPHS (Larry Gross et al. eds., 1988).
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In her work, Professor Gaines raises at least two primary concerns.
First, intellectual property law may be aiding and abetting the appropri-
ation of meaning "as it ties up property rights." 78 Second, Gaines raises
a communitarian concern that, as any aspect of culture "is organised
around the individual form," it compromises the "social form." 7 9
To my mind, however, the question of the relationship between
rights in the print age and in the electronic age seems much more diffi-
cult. Obviously "rights," or the lack of them, stand much more visible in
the electronic age. Yet, although more visible, it remains unclear
whether there exists any true differentiation or difference in kind in the
rights associated within these two broadly conceived eras.
II. A General Critique: A Deterministic Thesis?
Katsh developed a meta-thesis. As with any such thesis, the benefit is
that real insights may be generated along the way. But it would be
extraordinary if he had been able to articulate a unifying theory which
would explain all the problems and nuances of the relationship between
law and the new electronic media, let alone the "modern" nature of law.
The central argument of this book is threefold. First, law exists as
"a process of communication." 80 Second, that process is being trans-
formed by the new electronic media, which have fundamentally different
qualities from print media. Third, or so the argument seems to run, this
transformation is heavily deterministic-that is, it happens inexorably as
a result of these changes.
As to the first proposition, I should think that most people would
concede that law is, in part, a "process of communication." Most of us
would want to learn more precisely what is meant by a "process" in this
dimension. But leaving aside for a moment that kind of close analysis,8 1
the response to Katsh surely would be: "is that all that law is?" The
problem with a phenomenon like law is that it possesses many facets. If
one concentrates on a single facet, it can be brought into focus-some-
what-but one cannot contemporaneously concentrate on all the facets
at once. Law is commands, power, ethics, language, economics, and
many other elements. It is right to turn the spotlight on "law as commu-
78. GAINES, supra note 77, at 238. This view might need to be revised in light of
the general philosophy of copyright law recently expressed by the Supreme Court in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282,
(1991). Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor noted that the primary
purpose of copyright law is the promotion of learning; protection of the economic
interest(s) of the producer subsists as a secondary consideration.
79. KATSH, supra note 5, at 240.
80. KATSH, supra note 5, at 3.
81. See generally Sandra M. Huszagh & Fredrick W. Huszagh, A Model of the Law
Communication Process: Formal and Free Law, 13 GA. L. REv. 193 (1978); Sandra M.
Huszagh & Fredrick W. Huszagh, Production and Consumption of Informal Law: A Model
forIdentifyingInformation Loss, 13 GA. L. REV. 515 (1979); WALTER PROBERT, LAW, LAN-
GUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1972).
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nications," but one spotlight, or actor, does not usually a play make and
certainly not something as complex as law.
As to the second proposition, can it really be said that the evidence
is in, let alone conclusive, on the transformative character of the new
media on law? What is most striking about the electronic invasion is the
surprising ease with which lawyers have adapted it to the relatively tradi-
tional ends of the law. If this is so, the critical characteristic for social
scientists to note about law in relation to the arrival of electronic tech-
nology may be precisely the adaptability of law.
The question of whether Katsh's thesis is deterministic is very
important. I use the term determinism here in Pieter Geyl's sense: "a
concatenation of events, one following upon the other inevitably, caused
as they all are by a superhuman force or by impersonal forces working in
society independently from the wishes or efforts of individuals .... ."8 2
The critical importance of this question lays in how we comport
ourselves with respect to electronic technology. If technology is deter-
ministic, we have little or no choice, little or no free will, and hence very
little in the way of reponsibility. If, on the other hand, we do have wider
spheres of choice, how matters come out is ultimately a matter of
human- and legal-responsibility.
Marshall McLuhan thought the evolution of this kind of technology
to be deterministic-all one can do is hang on for the ride, and one
might as well enjoy it. Indeed, McLuhan appears to believe that some
kind of Utopia lays at the end of the ride.8 3 Other scholars lament this
perceived slide into technological dependency, which they claim ulti-
mately fragments and isolates humans.8 4
Those viewpoints represent the bipolar ends of a spectrum. Some
political economists tend to see the problem more as one of political
accomodation and struggle to reach a middle ground.85 A sophisticated
view of this may be found in the work of the Canadian political econo-
mist Harold Innis, who suggests a need to find a balance between the
claims of culture and power.8 6
Yet perhaps this spectrum is itself too simplistic. One of the finest
historians of technology, Daniel Boorstin, has reminded us that there
are really two kinds of revolutions to contend with. Political revolutions
have a "Why?" "People are moved to political revolutions by their
grievances, real or imagined, and by their desire for a change."8 7 Yet
with technological revolutions, "although in retrospect we can always
82. PIETER GEYL, DEBATES wrTH HISTORIANS 238 (1955). See also Thomas L. Has-
kell, Deterministic Implications of Intellectual History, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 132 (John Higham & Paul K. Conklin eds., 1979).
83. See generally MARSHALL McLuHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MAS-
SAGE (1967); MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION OF MAN
(1965).
84. See generally GEORGE GRANT, LAMENT FOR A NATION (1982).
85. HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS (Mary Q. Innes ed., 1989).
86. See generally ARTHUR KROKER, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CANADIAN MIND (1984).
87. DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, HIDDEN HISTORY 234 (1987).
Vol 26
1993 Review Essay
see large social, economic, and geographic forces at work," we have no
Why? Such revolutions are not "conscious and purposeful." 88 Political
revolution and change is purposeful. Technological change is a quest-
to boldly go where we have never gone before.8 9 Yet, as Boorstin sees
it, we have confused these two endeavours. "We have tried to make
government more experimental and at the same time to make techno-
logical change more purposive than ever before." 90
The failure to make the distinction leads to what Boorstin calls a
Gamut Fallacy. Gamut is an old English term meaning "the complete
range of anything." 9 1 "When we think of the future of our political life
we can have in mind substantially the whole range of possibilities ....
[this] authenticates the traditional wisdom of political theory .... that
political wisdom does not substantially progress .... [but w]e cannot
envisage, or even imagine, the range of alternatives from which future
technology will be made." 92 Politics is of our making; the physical
world is not.93 Hence, "[P]olitics is the Art of the Possible and ....
Technology is the Art of the Impossible."'94
Perhaps this explains Katsh's ambivalence. Much of his book bears
distinctly deterministic overtones; it seems to suggest distinct things are
inexorably occurring, and that either we cannot do anything about them
in the legal sphere, or that we have not been able to identify the
problems. Yet in other statements he remaians distinctly cautious.
"Research in the area of communications has not yet succeeded in
explaining the exact relationship between a new technology and changes
in institutional and personal life." 9 5
Where does this leave lawyers? The answer may be decidely con-
servative, and even contradict Katsh's very thesis: lawyers are likely left
where they have always been-mediating change. In the absence of
knowable, absolute answers, we have to come up with something less:
workable solutions, often of a temporising and contingent character, in
relation to technological developments. 96
For instance, who amongst us would confidently assert how the
"copyrightability" of computer programmes should be resolved as the
pace of development in that area swirls about us? Disputes, and impor-
tant ones at that, will inevitably arise. And they have to be decided, now.
88. Id. at 235.
89. With apologies to Gene Roddenburyl
90. BOORSTN, supra note 87, at 240.
91. Id. at 241.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 242.
94. Id. at 243.
95. Id at 267.
96. Learned Hand's abhorence of absolutes comes to mind here. As this consu-
mate intellectual property lawyer said of his Harvard Professors: "In the universe of
truth they lived by the sword; they asked no quarter of absolutes and they gave none.
Go ye and do likewise." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 77 (1958). Surely Hand
was right-we have to be prepared to discriminate, to grapple with details, to get our
hands dirty in this area, just as much as in any other.
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Hence the further the law is away from providing ultimate solutions of
its own, the greater the role of law in mediating the pace of change.
Three points merit attention in that dimension. First, political mod-
eration possesses distinct virtues in times of rapid change. The
approach of the authors of the preface to the Book of Common Prayer
comes to mind here, when they speak of that "happy mean between too
much stiffness in refusing, and too much easiness in admitting variations
in things once advisedly established."'9 7
Second, there are some underlying principles that can be identified
and need to be firmly adhered to. For instance, on the basis of all the
work done in many disciplines, it seems clear that open systems are pref-
erable to closed systems. Information flows of all kinds are critically
important to human welfare; yet, lawyers instinctively break up such
flows.
Third, in terms of technique, technology bound solutions are obvi-
ously obsolete. The form of present day legal instruments- judgments
and statutes-needs rethinking in technology related issues.
M. Directions for Future Research and Theory
If all we can do today in a practical sense is struggle for our answers, in
what way can those academics pursuing longer-term socio-legal research
assist in providing insights and possible solutions? What follows is a ten-
tative (and perhaps even presumptuous) agenda for socio-legal studies
in the law and technology area.
It is useful to begin by asking oneself: "What is worthy of inquiry?"
At least one can bare one's mind, as it were, on that. Then one may also
attempt to reach agreement with one's fellow scholars as to the right
kind of questions to be asked, even though the research of many schol-
ars would be necessary to tackle them, and a consensus on answers
might be difficult.
A. Politico-Legal Theory and Law
In its infancy, electronic technology was viewed by many in a utopian
light. It heralded, some thought, a greater distribution of wealth and
would generally promote more egalitarian societies and legal
arrangements.
Since that time something of a divergence of viewpoints has
occurred, particularly between Europe and North America. North
American social, economic and political theory, and practices have
largely absorbed electronic technology as a form of advanced capitalism.
Europe, on the other hand, perceives information technology more in
the nature of a national resource. Japan tends to see electronic technol-
ogy both ways-as an internal domestic resource for Japan, but also
something to be marketed externally as a commodity. These over-arch-
97. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 9 (1979).
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ing viewpoints at least inform, and in many cases visibly drive, legal
doctrine.
The current North American viewpoint is simplicity itself: to a sig-
nificant degree property rights should be attached to information inter-
ests. The state in turn should "commodify" its information interests, as
it does, for instance, in the theory of modem freedom of information
statues. Hence the debate tends to be more over the strength, or inci-
dents attaching to the particular property interest.
Of course, more sophisticated, and also contradictory, analyses
exist. David Bell evolved a quite complex concept of a post-industrial
society.98 Marxists berated him.99 But this was on a simplistic basis-
the end of an industrial age represented to many (most?) Marxists a
change in subject matter that yanked the rug out from under them. If
the industrial age ends, what happens to the basic Marxist postulates of
material primacy and the ultimate triumph of the proletariat? But, of
course, the Marxist thesis may possess even more staying power than its
proponents give it, or its students read into it, for there is no intrinsic
reason why capitalism should be limited to industrial capitalism. 100
The learning and the problem for researchers is surely this: the
meaning of class and power is absolutely fundamental in today's world,
when information technology now overlays older agrarian and industrial
traditions. If Marx put his finger on capital as the fundamental concept
of the industrial age, Bell put his finger on information as the organising
concept of the new society.' 01 But what has happened to the idea of
class? Has it just withered away?
David Lyon helpfully points out that analytically three answers may
be possible to this question.' 02 It may be that we have or will achieve a
classless society from this technical revolution. Lyon calls this "class
rejected." Alternatively, capitalism may get into bed with information
technology, thus leading to "class reasserted," but in an even stronger
form. Or, finally, the resulting mix may be different-fundamentally
so-resulting in "class reconceptualised."
Lyon's analysis is revealing. We can already reject alternative one:
in fact information underclasses abound, and the Third World protests
information imperialism. Alternative two seems to be the alternative
98. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 100 and 102.
100. Easily the most significant Marxist work in relation to intellectual property
was published in French by Bernard Edelman: LE DRorr SAIsI PAR LA
PHOTOGRAPHIE: ELEMENTS POUR UNE THEORIE MARXISTE DU DROIT (1973). An English
language translation exists, see BERNARD EDELMAN, THE OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE:
ELEMENTS OF A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth Kingdom trans., 1979). This
work received practically no attention from North American legal scholars, notwith-
standing its important theoretical dimensions, which also extend well beyond intel-
lectual property law.
101. See R. Grant Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property Rigths
to Information, 27 McGILL LJ. 47 (1981).
102. DAVID LYON, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: ISSUES AND ILLUSIONS 55-63 (1988).
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North America conciously aims to achieve, whereas alternative three lies
closer to the European viewpoint.
B. Economics and Law
I have suggested elsewhere that it is essential that lawyers get to grips
with the economics of information, and endeavour to relate that to law
generally and legal rules in particular.10 3 This is a fiendishly difficult
task. Part of the problem is that the age-old lawyers' instinct to reify
information comes to the fore. It is easier to commodify information,
even though one knows that some of the characteristics of information
are not anything like those of a widget.' 0 4 The reification is also attrac-
tive to entrepreneurs, because it triggers a ready made pool of exclu-
sionary property doctrine.
We need more and better theory on the economics of information,
as well as more localised investigations against which to test that theory.
Given the careful record keeping associated with the law, the legal enter-
prise would be a fertile ground for investigation.
C. Geography of Law
What are we to make of the fact that in all the advanced economies,
recent economic growth has been concentrated in the service industries,
particularly those associated with information technology, and in particu-
larplaces? Only a minimal amount of work by socio-legal scholars exists
on the geography of law;105 a similar dearth exists in studies by geogra-
phers on the geography of information.
Manuel Castells' monumental The Informational City 106 remains the
classic work in the area of informational services from a geographical
perspective. Castells offers an immense amount of sophisticated analy-
sis, but his message is plain enough on several fronts. Castells rejects
what he calls a new informational mode of development as the product
of the new technologies; nor does he find that technologies are some
sort of mechanical response to the current kind of organisational sys-
tems. As Castells sees it, the new technologies follow their own kind of
logic. Indeed, information technology in particular has a great deal to
do with the three major changes in capitalist economies in the last dec-
ade. These changes are the increasing surplus from production; the
move in state intervention away from social redistribution; and, finally,
accelerated internationalisation. Most importantly, from his perspective
as an urban sociologist, Castells finds what he labels a "new industrial
space," reflecting different kinds of spatial divisions of labour, the gen-
eration of information in new innovative milieux, extreme flexibility in
location, and decentralization of production functions. The result, in
103. Grant, supra note 44; see also Grant, supra note 45.
104. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
105. For a useful introduction, see Kim Economides et al., The Spatial Analysis of
Legal Systems: Towards a Geography of Law, 13J.L. & Soc. 161 (1986).
106. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATIONAL CrrY (1989).
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all, is a geography of flows, rather than a geography of places.
Organisations themselves become placeless.
Castells is also concerned about the outcome, because "[p]eople
live in places, [yet] power rules through flows." 1 0 7 His ideal answer-in
fact already happening in many ways-is the reinvention of the city
state.108 Amongst other things, "citizens' data banks, interactive com-
munications systems, and community based multi-media systems" can
be powerful weapons for "citizen participation."' 0 9 In the end, Castells
would like to see informational cities that are community based.
The implications of this analysis extend to the way lawyers think on
many structural and technical issues. Markets, for the purposes of anti-
trust and trade practices legislation might well look quite different.
Intellectual property law should be far more resource based. What
would passport law look like? Local government structures and law
would similarly have to undergo quite radical alterations.
In relation to the development of electronic technology, these are
only some of the areas of concern which need more attention in socio-
legal studies. Along with the valuable work being done in communica-
tions studies and law-which is really where Katsh's book fits-they hold
at least some promise of helping us come to grips with the meaning of
the world we now live in and to help us to shape our individual and
collective destinies, to whatever extent we can.
107. Id. at 349.
108. This sentence echos of his brilliant study of community power. MANUEL CAS-
TELLS, THE CrrY AND THE GRAsSROOTS (1983).
109. CASTELLS, supra note 106, at 353.

